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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

REID E. JENSEN,

Plaintiff and
Appellant,

CASE NO.

14838

-vsCONiUE GAIL THOMAS,
Defendant and
Respondent.
---0000000---

APPELLANT'S BRIEF OF NEWLY UNCOVERED CASES

Pursuant to Rule 75(p) (3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
respondent submits the attached pages of newly uncovered cases for
~sertion in the reply brief of appellant,

all cases applying to

POINT IV of appellant's reply brief.
DATED this

,-( day of

~;_)_1·-;-~._1 19 77.

By

k?t I .~ i!R

ROBERT J. DEBRY
/
Attorney for Appellani(
2040 East 4800 South, #203
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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The case of

Ric~e~t

is also instructive.

v. Hayes, 473 S.W. 2d 446 (Arkansas 1971)

In Rickett, an action for medical malpractice,

the lower court ruled that the plaintiff could not, prior to trial,
depose the defendant's expert witness about his opinion as to whether
or not the defendant had met the standard of care required of
doctors in that locality.

On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court

held that such denial constituted reversible error and the case was
remanded for a new trial.

Concerning the pre-trial discovery of

the opinion of an expert witness the court stated at 448-51:
We have recognized the importance of crossexamination of an adverse witness not only to
test his credibility but also in an attempt to
wring disclosures which might modify or explain
his testimony on direct examination or bring it
into a perspective which might present a view
more favorable to the cross-examiner.
Planning effective cross-examination of adversary
witnesses is one of a trial lawyer's most important responsibilities in preparation for trial,
particularly when the witnesses are experts.
See
Allen v. Arkansas State Highway Commission, supra;
United States v. 23.76 Acres, 32 F.R.D. 593,
(D.C. Md. 1963).
Handicaps to attempting full
cross-examination of an expert witness without
pre-trial discovery of his opinion with its
supporting data and theoretical basis are discussed
by Professor Friedenthal in "Discovery and Use of·
an Adverse Party's Expert Information," 14 Stanford
Law Review 455, 485 et seq.
The desirability of
permitting discovery of adverse expert witnesses
to enable advance preparation for effective crossexamination is well stated in the Advisory Committee's
Notes to Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Relating to Discovery at 48 F.R.D. 487.
Depositions taken under the applicable statute may be
used for the express purpose of contradicting or
impeaching the testimony of the deponent at the trial
of the case. Ark. Stat. Ann. 28-348 (d) (1).
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Decisions upholding limitations on discovery of
an expert witness, particularly where there was
a foreclosure of inquiry as to the expert's opinions
and conclusions, are abundant and might well support
an order such as that entered here in the ordinary
case.
Still, there are recognized exceptions to the
otherwise proper limitation of discovery of the
conclusions of an adverse party's expert where the
evidence is indispensable to a determination of a
material issue and would be otherwise unavailable.
Leininger v. Swadner, 279 Minn. 251, 156 N.W.2d 254
(1968); United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th
Cir. 1968).
An entirely different situation obtains,
however, when the expert's testimony pertains to the
very crux of the issue to be determined on trial.
United States v. Meyer, supra; United States v.
364.82 Acres of Land, 38 F.R.D. 411 (D.C.Cal. 1965).
For example, in an eminent domain proceeding, the
critical issue is usually the amount of just
compensation, and evidence on that issue generally
consists of the opinions of opposing experts and
the factual and theoretical bases upon which they
rest.
In United States v. Meyer, supra, it was held
that a landowner was entitled to a disclosure of the
condemnor's appraisers' opinions and their factual
and theoretical foundations to enable him to fairly
evaluate the respective claims for settlement purposes,
determine the real area of dispute, narrow the actual
issues, avoid surprise and prepare adequately for crossexamination and rebuttal.
In so holding, the court
there recognized that the weight to which an appraiser's
opinion testimony is entitled rests upon the validity
of the appraiser's premises, procedures, and theories,
the soundness of his factual determinations, the methods
he has followed and the formulae he has applied. The
court in Meyer felt that full pre-trial disclosure of
the opinions of the experts was essential to the
accomplishment of the basic purposes of the discovery
rules, and that the opinions of these appraisers and
their basis were information that could not be obtained
from any other source.
The same effect, see Franks v.
National Dairy Products Corporation, 41 F.R.D. 234 (D.C.
Texas 1966), aff'd 414 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1969);
United States v. 23.76 Acres, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D.C.
Md. 1963).
The propriety of pretrial examination of an
adverse expert in such cases for the purpose of trial
cross-examination is consistent with the rationale of
llickfllan v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed.
451 (1347) and the ideal of liberal construction there
express~d.
A similar result has been reached in permitting discovery of certain reports of an adverse party's
expert
in a patent infringement case as part of the facts
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
and Technology
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involved. E.Library
I. Services
DuPont
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Pe_t_r_o_l~eum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416 (D.C. Del. 1959).
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Thus, in a situation where it mioht be calculated
that the particular expert's tesfimony would carry
considerable weight, appellant's attorneys may well
have been severely handicapped, as he claimed on the
threshold of the trial, in conducting a cross-examination of this witness, which might be the only effective
means of minimizing the weioht to be given to his
testimony by the jury.
Because of this, the trial
court's order was unduly restrictive.
This conclusion
is in harmony with our longstanding commitment to the
liberal interpretation of the discovery act necessary
to accomplish its salutary purposes.
See Bower v.
Murphy, 247 Ark. 238, 444 S.W.2d 883; Arkansas State
Highway Commission v. Stanley, 234 Ark. 428, 353 S.W.2d
173, 4 A.L.R.3d 749.
Even though appellant's attorneys conducted an
apparently extensive cross-examination of Dr. Stuckey,
we cannot say that the error in unduly restricting the
scope of discovery inquiry was harmless in view of what
we have said.
We could only speculate whether the
cross-examination would have been more effective if
appellant had not been limited in his discovery. We
presume that error is prejudicial unless we can say-with
assurance that the record discloses that it is harmless.
Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Parks, 240 Ark. 719,
401 S.W.2d 732, 26 A.L.R.3d 775; Allen v. Arkansas State
Highway Commission, 247 Ark. 857, 448 S.W.2d 27. This we
cannot do.
As in Ricketts, the expert opinion testimony here went to the
heart of plaintiff's case.

This is so because the only real issues

to be tried were whether Thomas caused Jensen's visual problems
and, if so, how much Jensen should be paid to compensate him for

his injuries.

It was, therefore mandatory that Jensen's attorney be

furewarned as to Dr. Hershgold's opinion as to causation, so that
counsel could prepare for cross-examination.

Jensen's counsel,

however' was given no forewarning but instead learned of Dr. Hershgcild' ,
testimony for the first time as it was being given to the jury in
open court.

Under these facts, as in Ricketts, the only fair way
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to handle the problem is to grant a new trial.

Appellant's

respectfully request that a new trial be granted.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

/

-

·

~ /
day of._;/. ; 1977, two

-;

true and correct copies of the foregoing Appella~t's Brief of
Newly Uncovered Cases were delivered to Stephen Nebeker, attorney
for respondent, 400 Deseret Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

•

•

I

/

I
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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the lower court's refusal to grant a new
trial.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Jensen sued Thomas for negligence.
"no cause of action".

The jury returned a verdict

Jensen moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule

59 (a) (3) on the grounds of surprise.

The lower court denied Jensen's

motion for a new trial.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Jensen seeks a new trial.

FACTS
1.

On January 16, 1974, Jensen and Thomas were involved in an

auto collision (Record 295).
2.

The proximate cause of the collision was Thomas' negligence

IRecord 176 ) .
3.

A few hours after the collision, Jensen experienced a type of

temporary blindness known as Transcient Ischemic Attacks (hereinafter
T.I.A.) (Record 290-91).

prior to the collision
has

Jensen had never expereinced any T. I.A. attack
(Record 302).

The frequency of the T. I.A. attac

gradually increased from the time of the accident to the trial

IRecord 30 3-304).

4

·

At trial the only issue presented to the jury was whether or

not the T. I. A. was caused by the collision

(Record 176) ·
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5.
of action"

6.

The jury returned a verdict for Thomas

"no :.

(R. 188).
Jensen made a timely motion for a new tria;
1

upon surprise (R. 227).
for a new trial

The lower court denied Jensen's.

(R. 263).
POINT ONE

COUNSEL FOR THOMAS INJECTED SURPRISE TESTIMONY
INTO THE TRIAL
1.

During the pretrial discovery, Jensen advis;

Thomas that two theories would be presented at trial. :::
that the auto caused Transcient Ischemic Attacks or "min:
strokes".

1

Second, that the auto accident caused Raynaucs

disease (R. 95, 96).
2.

On March 2 5, 19 7 6, Jensen served the followc

interrogatory on Thomas:

"Identify each expert witness ;·:

!

intend to call at the trial of the above-entitled matter,
identify by name, address, specialty, and the basic subst::,

I

of the said witnesses testimony (R.
3.

74).

In response to the interrogatory, Thomas sta:,

cal~' I

that Dr. Edward Hershgold and Dr. Reed Clegg would be
as defendant's expert witnesses

(R. 85).

Thomas further

· · ted to t)e
stated that Hershgold's testimony would be 1 imi
. .
d Rayna':
causal relationship between the auto collision an
'

disease (R. -- two un-numbered sheets between Record

226.

Record 227; also R. 257).

4.

After the deposition of Hershgold

Jensen informed Thomas that Jensen

~
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n·

relationship between the auto collision and the Raynauds; and
that Jensen would proceed on the sole theory that the auto
collision caused the T.I.A.
5.

(R. 98 and 99, also R. 258).

Jensen further notified Thomas that Dr. Rich and

Dr. van Dyke would testify for Jensen on the causal relationship
between the auto collision and the T.I.A.
6.

(R. 98).

Shortly before the trial, Thomas notified Jensen of

a last minute expert witness who would testify on the causal
relationship between the auto accident and the T.I.A.

The

last minute witness was named Dr. Jarcho (R. 258).
7.

Jensen advised Thomas that Van Dyke's (Jensen's

expert on T.I.A.)

testimony would be given at trial by

deposition (Van Dyke deposition p. 3).
8.

It was further stipulated by counsel that

Jarcho'~

(Thomas' expert on T.I.A.) testimony would be given at trial
by deposition
9.

(R. 258 §8).
In summary the pretrial discovery fully disclosed

that Jensen had dropped his claim for a causal relationship
between the collision and Raynauds.

The only issue for trial

was the causal relation between the collision and T.I.A.

Thomas

was committed to present the Jarcho deposition on the T.I.A.
issue.

Jensen was committed to present the Van Dyke deposition

on the T.I.A. issue.

10.

Notwithstanding the detailed and extensive pretrial

discovery and pretrial stipulations discussed above, Thomas
called Dr. Hershgold as a witness even though Raynauds was not
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an issue.

Notwithstanding express representations to ...
~.I~

contrary (R.

two un-numbered sheets between R. 226 _.

Thomas began to interrogate Hershgold on matters direct:
related to T. I.A.
11.

(R. 234 - R.

238).

Jensen made a timely objection to the sur::

testimony (R. 238) and advised the court that:
MR. DeBRY:
You (counsel for Thomas) indic:
that Dr. Hershgold would be a witness, and thero
at our expense, our time, we took Dr. Hershgo1:·
deposition and we asked by Interrogatory who •;c.
intended to call.
And you indicated by Answe~:
Interrogatory that you intended to call Dr. Her:
on the issue of Raynauds.
And, therefore, we we·
to the time -- we went to the expense to interrc
him on that issue.
Now, that issue has n~m~
brought up in this case.
And we are completely·
by surprise and completely prejudiced. And ~he:;
no way we haven 't had a chance to interview or'.
a deposition of this witness beyond the scope c'
Raynaud's problem.
And if the interrogation goes beyond the s::
of the Raynaud' s problem, it is no issue in th1:
case (R. at 239).
12.

(R.

241 and R.
13.

Jensen also moved that the testimony be str.
242).

Jensen's objections were overru 1 e d and Hee'

was permitted to continue with the surprise testimony(?..
14.

Thereafter Thomas did not publish the Jarc

deposition but relied solely on the surprise testirrony ::
Hershgold.
POINT TWO

r"

THE SURPRISE TESTIMONY OF DR. HERSHGO~
PREJUDICIAL AND DAMAGING TO ~:?!_
. 1 di scn"er",
By reason of the pretria
··
·
.
y O!l
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library.
Funding for digitization
provided
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be from the Jarcho deposition (Point One, supra).
2.

The Jarcho testimony on the issue of causation

was completely innocuous.

For example, the

critic~l

part of

the Jarcho deposition was as follows:
Q.

Based upon your examination and upon
the history which he gave you and
upon your opinion as a neurologist,
first of all have you come to any
conclusion about this particular
visual disturbance based upon a
reasonable medical certainty?

A.

I haven't come to a conclusion but I
can, if you wish, discuss possible
causes which I have considered.
(Deposition of Jarcho p. 15 and 16).

3.

Indeed the Jarcho deposition was probably not even

admissable on the issue of causal relationship between the
collision and the T. I.A.

Moore v. Denver

4 Utah 2d 255; 292 P.2d 849
4.

&

Rio Grande Railro<'

(1956).

At trial, Jensen's expert gave testimony (by

deposition) that the auto collision was to a reasonable
medical certainty the cause of the T.I.A.
5.

(R. 376).

In summary, prior to the surprise testimony of

Hershgold, Thomas had no expert testimony on causation of
T.I.A.

On the other hand Jensen's expert gave very persuasive

testimony on the causation of the T.I.A.
6.

The surprise testimony of Hershgold immediately

changed the entire complexion of the trial.

With absolutely

no forewarning, Hershgold gave extensive testimony on
causation of T.I,A.
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First, Hershgold gave extensive testimony desc:.
how T. I.A. is caused by hardening of the arteries.
Hershgold stated that,

".

.

In'.:

. the most common cause, bv,

of Transcient Ischemic Attacks is first the roug hening c'
the blood vessel which comes from hardening of the arter
(R. 2 36).

Hershgold then went on to testify that he fo.;

Jensen to have hardening of the arteries (R. 237-238).
implied argument was that hardening of the arteries not:
auto collision caused the T. I.A.

Then on redirect exam1:1

Hershgold gave his expert opinion that the T. I.A. was ca:
by hardening of the arteries and not by the auto collisJC
(R.

251-252).

8.

Moreover, the surprise testimony of

Dr. Her:

was an express violation of Rule 26 (e) (1) (B) which states
"A party is under a duty to ;easonably supplement his

re:: 1

with respect to any question directly addressed to · · ·:
identity of each person expected to be called as an expe:witness at trial, and the subject matter on which he i:.J
to testify".

(Emphasis added)
POINT THREE

PLAINTIFF HAS NO PRACTICAL REMEDY TO SURPRISE
A NEW TRIAL

TEST~

A lawyer's "first line of defense" to surprise
testimony is to make appropriate objections
However, upon analysis it is apparent
more illusory than real.

at the trial.

that that remedy is

c·:
Merely making the objection '
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more harm than good.

The jury resents the objecting party

because they feel he is trying to hide something.

Moreover,

the fact that an objection is made tends to focus the
jury's attention on the prejudicial material.

As the

supreme Court in Alabama has noted in a similar case,
"To insist upon and argue such a matter
at that time would tend to magnify the fact
in the estimation of the jury.
It would,
therefore, seem appropriate to wait and make
a motion for a new trial if the decision is
adverse and have that as one of the grounds".
Parker v. Williams, 99 So. 2d 210 (Ala. 1957)
After the surprise testimony gets in, the opposing
lawyer is faced with the problem of whether or not to cross
examine.

If there is no cross-examination, the jury might

infer that the opposing lawyer concedes the truthfulness
of the testimony.

On the other hand, if the opposing lawy,,r

attemps a cross-examination, he is faced with the problem
of cross-examining an expert witness without any preparation.
In short, surprise testimony may theoretically be
cured by appropriate objection and instruction from the
court at the time of trial; however, as a practical matter
such devices are ineffective and the only true remedy is a
new trial.
POINT FOUR
RELEVANT STATUTES A."JD CASE LAW EXPRESSLY PROVIDE FOR A NEW
TRIAL IN THIS TYPE OF SITUATION
Rule 59(a) (3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that a new trial may be granted for accident or surpris
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.
.
The Utah Supreme Court has reviewed the statutes on onl .
few occasions, Snell v. Cisler, 1 Utah 298 (187 6);~
L.

&

I. R. Co. v. Jones, 51 Utah 62

Co. v. Coulter, 3 Utah 174
314

(1917), Stewart Minin:

(1881), Flinders v. Hunt,

6~

(1922), and none of these seem to be in point here.

However, other courts when faced with the situation of
surprise testimony have not hesitated to order a new tri:
if the evidence introduced was prejudicial.
The most recent case is Reis v. McComb, 545 P.1c
(Ariz. 1976).

In that case the plaintiff claimed to have 1

given a $4,000.00 promissory note signed by the defendan:
At the trial the defendant suddenly introduced the defens:
that he was in California on the date the note was made.
A friend also testified introducing an appointment book•'
showed that the two had been together in California on th!
day in question.

In that case the Court made particular

note that "discovery indicated nothing to appellant about·
unusual twist which McComb' s story would take.

Througho':

his deposition, answers to interrogatories, and his answe:
to request for admissions McComb denied knowing anything
about the note.

No supplementary answers to app

ellant 's

e 1 uded that thi:
The court Con
rise" and gran:·
was a "most agregious demonstration o f Surp
interrogatories were filed.

a new trial.
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In the case of Walker v. Distler, 296 P.2d 452
(Ida. 1956), the plaintiff brought a malpractice suit against
ter physician for injuries allegedly suffered as a result of
his administration of an anaesthetic.

At the trial the

physician presented a defense that emergency conditions
required the administration of an anaesthetic.

In order

to prove the emergency condition, the physician introduced
results of the plaintiff's urine tests without forwarning the
plaintiff.

Based on surprise the trial court ordered a

new trial and the Supreme Court affirmed.
In Whitfield v. Debrincat, 64 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1937)
a witness gave surprise testimony.

In affirming a new trial

the appellate court stated that,
"All of the cases ,1qree l at if a witness
suddenly changes . : . or fails to testify
in accordance with his previous assurances,
by reason of any fact or occurrence of
which neither the witness nor the party
calling him is in any measure responsible
that a new trial will be granted
ex debito justitiae."
POINT FIVE
IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO MOVE FOR A MISTRIAL AT THE TIME OF
SURPRISE
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not require
counsel to make a motion for mistrial when confronted with
the surprise testimony in order to later qualify for a new
trial.
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Cases from some foreign jurisdictions have so:,.
times stated that one seeking a new tr·ia 1 b ased on sur··
,.
must move for a mistrial when confronted wi.· th th e surpr:
testimony.

There are no Utah cases on poi.· nt.

However,

the best reasoned cases hold that it is not necessary::
move for a new trial at the time of surprise.

The case

Whitfield v. Debrincat, supra, specifically addressed t:.
point and concluded that "the bell had rung, and could:.:
be unrung".

Likewise in Reis v. McComb, supra, and Wak

v. Distler, supra, it does not appear that the moveant :"
motion for mistrial at the time of trial.
In Maher v. Roisner, 57 N.W. 2d 810 (Minn. 195:
plaintiff's counsel dropped an envelope containing newsfa:
advertisements which the court had ruled inadmissable. :·
was clear that the jury saw some of the ads as counsel;::
up.

Although defense counsel did not move for a mistria:

even object at the time, the Minnesota Supreme Court orde:
a new trial.

"Where the misconduct was a fundamental an(

manifest as that exhibited here, we feel that the new

w:.

was not to discipline counsel for any misconduct, but ~a:
necessary to correct the extreme prejudice that the defe:.:
had suffered.
And, in McLemore v.

·

Internati.ona

1 uni0!1_, 88 so.
~

the words

2d 170 (Ala. 1956), defendant's counsel wrote

"equality" and "liberty" on the courtroom floor

with cha'.

and then referred to them during his argument.
ld that thl;

there was no objection at the time, it was he
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conduct was prejudicial, and required a ne

w trial.

•

POINT SIX
THE LOWER COURTS REFUSAL TO GRA."JT A NEW TRIAL WAS AN ABUSE
OF DISCRETION
It is sometimes said that the power to grant or
deny a new trial rests generally within the sound discretion
of the trial court.

Nevertheless it is clear that the

Supreme Court will review any abuse of discretion exercised
by the lower court.

Salt Lake City v. Anderson, 148 P.2d

346, 106 Utah 350.
The term "abuse of discretion" should not be a tool
to mechanically "rubber stamp" the conduct of the lower court
judge.

Indeed it has been held that the phrase "abuse of

discretion" does not cast any reflection upon the lower court
judge, but indicates that the appellate court is simply
of the opinion that there was a commission of error in the la 1
and the circumstances.

Media v. District Court for Otero

County, 493 P.2d 617 (Colo. 1972).
In weighing the "abuse of discretion" of the lower
court, this court should also consider the policy considerations of this case.

When judges and lawyers in Utah analyze

whether a new trial is appropriate for surprise they will
read two things.

They will read the statute (Rule 59(a} (3))

and they will read this case.
this.

The policy question is simply

If the facts here do not compel a new trial under the

statute, where then is the line.

Shouldn't a lwayer in Utah

be able to protect himself from surprise testimony by
thorough discovery and preparation?

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
OCR, may contain_
errors.
. . . . . . . . . . . . ._ _ _ _ _Machine-generated
_ _ _ _ __,.;;.1u1.;;.....
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Mr. Jensen deserves a new trial under the statut!
but even more, lawyers and judges in Utah need the guid·
of this court in how to fairly prepare and conduct their
trials.
CONCLUSION
Defendant improperly injected surprise testimony
into the trial.

The surprise testimony was highly prej'

and forced plaintiff's counsel to cross-examine an expert
witness without any prior notice or preparation.

The l

court erred in not granting a new trial pursuant to Rule
59

Procedure.

(a) (3) of the Utah Rules
DATED this

:3J_

day of

This is to certify that I mailed a true copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant to Stephen Nebeker, attorn~
for defendant, at his address of 400 Deseret Building,
, ,

I

,~

-

Salt Lake City, Utah, this__/,,;Jaay of
postage prepaid and properly addressed·.
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